



JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

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**TESTIMONY OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
HEARING ON THE PROPOSED TAX TREATIES WITH CHILE, HUNGARY,
AND POLAND, THE PROPOSED TAX PROTOCOLS WITH JAPAN,
LUXEMBOURG, SPAIN AND SWITZERLAND, AND THE PROPOSED
PROTOCOL AMENDING THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON
MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS¹**

OCTOBER 29, 2015

My name is Thomas A. Barthold. I am Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. It is my pleasure to present the testimony of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation today concerning the proposed income tax treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland, the proposed tax protocols with Japan, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland, and the proposed protocol amending the multilateral mutual administrative assistance treaty.

Overview

The Joint Committee staff has prepared pamphlets covering each of the proposed treaties and protocols.² The pamphlets provide detailed descriptions of the proposed treaties and

¹ This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, *Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland the Proposed Tax Protocols with Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain, and Japan, and the Proposed Protocol Amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters* (JCX-137-15), October 29, 2015. This document is available on the internet at <http://www.jct.gov>.

² Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol Amending the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Japan* (JCX-XX-15), October XX, 2015; Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Hungary* (JCX-32-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Luxembourg* (JCX-30-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Switzerland* (JCX-31-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol Amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters* (JCX-9-14), February 21, 2014; Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Chile* (JCX-10-14), February 24, 2014. Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Poland* (JCX-68-14), June 17, 2014; and Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the*

protocols, including, in the case of the income tax treaties and protocols, comparisons with the United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 (“U.S. Model treaty”), which reflects preferred U.S. tax treaty policy, and with other recent U.S. tax treaties. The pamphlets also provide detailed discussions of issues raised by the proposed treaties and protocols. We consulted with the Treasury Department and with the staff of your committee in analyzing the proposed treaties and protocols and in preparing the pamphlets.

The principal purposes of the proposed income tax treaties and protocols are to reduce or eliminate double taxation of income earned by residents of either country from sources within the other country and to prevent avoidance or evasion of the taxes of the two countries. The proposed income tax treaties and protocols also are intended to promote close economic cooperation between the treaty countries and to eliminate possible barriers to trade and investment caused by overlapping taxing jurisdictions of the treaty countries. As in other U.S. income tax treaties, these objectives principally are achieved through each country’s agreement to limit, in certain specified situations, its right to tax income derived from its territory by residents of the other country.

The principal purpose of the multilateral mutual assistance treaty is to promote increased cooperation in tax administration and enforcement among the parties to the treaty.

The proposed protocol with Japan amends an existing treaty, last amended by a protocol signed November 6, 2003. The proposed protocol with Spain would amend an existing tax treaty signed on February 22, 1990 and its protocol. The proposed treaty with Poland would replace an existing income tax treaty signed on October 8, 1974. The proposed treaty with Hungary would replace an existing income tax treaty signed in 1979. The proposed protocol with Luxembourg would amend an existing tax treaty that was signed in 1996. The proposed protocol with Switzerland would amend an existing tax treaty and previous protocol that were both signed in 1996. The proposed treaty with Chile is the first income tax treaty with that nation. The last proposed protocol under consideration by your committee amends the multilateral mutual administrative assistance in tax matters agreement that the United States ratified in 1991.

My testimony today will first provide an article-by-article summary of the principal features of the proposed protocol with Japan. My testimony will also address the extent to which the U.S. Model treaty continues to represent U.S. tax policy, as reflected in the issues related to benefits conferred under the various agreements pending with your Committee and issues related to mutual administrative assistance. With respect to the former, these issues include the limitation-on-benefits provisions in the treaties with Spain, Chile and Hungary; zero-withholding for parent-subsidiary dividends in Spain, Japan; and the commitment included in the proposed protocol with Spain to negotiate toward an agreement between Puerto Rico and Spain. With

United States and Spain (JCX-67-14), June 17, 2014. The pamphlets describing the proposed treaty with Hungary and the proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland were prepared in connection with a Committee on Foreign Relations hearing held on June 7, 2011. The pamphlet describing the proposed treaty with Chile was prepared in connection with the hearing of the Committee on February 26, 2014. The pamphlets describing the proposed treaty with Poland and the proposed protocol with Spain were prepared in connection with the hearing on June 19, 2014.

respect to the latter, the issues are the exchange of information modernization included in all of the agreements, including the expansion of the multilateral mutual administrative assistance agreement; the mandatory arbitration provisions of the protocols with Switzerland, Spain and Japan; and the expanded collection assistance agreed upon with Japan.

Article-by-article summary of proposed protocol with Japan

The proposed protocol with Japan includes the following significant changes to the existing treaty.

Article II provides that companies that are resident in both Japan and the United States (dual resident companies) will not be considered resident of either jurisdiction for purposes of the treaty. As a result, the treaty benefits available to such companies are limited to those that are available to nonresidents.

Article III reduces the thresholds for exemption from source-country taxation of dividends from subsidiaries resident in one country to a parent corporation resident in the other treaty country. Under the proposed protocol, ownership of 50-percent or more, rather than ownership of more than 50 percent, qualifies. Article III also reduces the required holding period for elimination of source-country taxation on such dividends to the six-month period ending on the date on which entitlement to the dividends is determined. Both the ownership standard and the holding period thresholds depart from recent U.S. tax treaties that provided zero-rate withholding contingent upon a 12-month holding period and 80-percent ownership.

Article IV replaces Article 11 of the existing treaty, regarding taxation of cross-border interest payments (interest payments arising in one treaty country to residents of the other treaty country). First, the proposed protocol brings the tax treatment of cross-border interest payments into closer alignment with the rules described in the U.S. Model treaty and exempts such interest from source-country taxation. The interest remains subject to tax in the residence country. Anti-abuse provisions are also provided that permit source-country taxation, notwithstanding the above rule, for contingent interest payments and payments with respect to ownership in entities used for securitization of real estate mortgages.

Article V revises the definition of real property in Article 13 of the existing treaty to conform more closely to the U.S. Model treaty.

Article VII repeals Article 20 of the existing treaty, which provides certain benefits to researchers and teachers from one jurisdiction when they are temporarily present in the other jurisdiction, consistent with modern treaty policy of both the United States and Japan. A conforming change is made by Article I to paragraph 5 of Article 1 of the existing treaty.

Article IX revises the rules regarding foreign tax credits to conform to changes in Japanese statutory rules for relief from double taxation. The changes reflect the recent adoption of a participation exemption system in Japan.

Article X revises the nondiscrimination rules of Article 24 of the existing treaty to reflect the changes to Article 11, as summarized above.

Article XI provides mandatory and binding arbitration in mutual agreement procedure cases pending before the competent authorities without resolution for two years or more. The provision is similar in scope and process to that found in recent treaties and in the proposed protocol with Spain that is also pending before the Committee. The new article includes procedures to ensure confidentiality of taxpayer information and the mutual agreement process are included, as well as rules for the selection of members of the arbitration panel to avoid conflicts of interest. The taxpayer is permitted an opportunity to participate in the proceeding in the form of a presentation of views and reasoning. Each competent authority is permitted to provide views, reasoning and its proposed solution to each issue. The panel must reach a determination that selects the proposed solution of one of the competent authorities. That determination is not accorded precedential value and does not include a rationale or other reasoning.

The article prescribes standards similar but not identical to those found in recent treaties with Belgium, France, Germany, and Canada, and is a departure from the U.S. Model treaty. First, it does not require the presenter of the case to have filed a return with each of the two jurisdictions. It also may expedite the schedule on which a taxpayer who seeks a bilateral advanced pricing agreement may contest a proposed adjustment that is related to the subject of the pending request for a pricing agreement, thus compelling arbitration if the competent authorities do not reach agreement on the bilateral advanced pricing agreement. The proposed article also departs from the U.S. Model treaty general rules limiting participation of the taxpayer in any mutual agreement proceedings by allowing the taxpayer who presents a case to submit a position paper directly to the arbitration panel.

Article XII of the proposed protocol modernizes the exchange of information provisions of Article 26. The revised exchange of information provisions conform to modern standards similar to those in the U.S. Model treaty and the OECD Model treaty. Unlike the U.S. Model treaty, the proposed protocol includes a specific provision that the obligation to exchange information does not override domestic law privilege that attaches to confidential communications.

Article XIII expands the mutual collection assistance available under Article 27 to include taxes not otherwise covered by the treaty, and to permit collection assistance against one's own nationals on behalf of the other jurisdiction in cases of fraudulent conduct by the citizen. The provision abrogates the Revenue Rule, a common law doctrine against providing collection assistance to which the United States has generally adhered. The changes to the scope of collection assistance are similar to those in treaties with only five other countries: France, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Denmark. There is no comparable provision in the U.S. Model treaty, and the United States expressly reserved with respect to a similar provision that is included in the OECD Multilateral treaty that is also pending before this Committee. The article requires the competent authorities to negotiate limitations on the extent to which such assistance will be sought or provided, in order to assure that administrative burden is not unfairly imposed on either jurisdiction.

Article XIV amends the 2003 Protocol to provide rules for the implementation of both arbitration and collection provisions, as well as conforming changes.

The extent to which the U.S. Model treaty continues to reflect U.S. tax policy

The most recent U.S. Model treaty was published in 2006. A number of U.S. income tax treaties and protocols to earlier treaties have entered into force since then. Significant deviations from the U.S. Model treaty have, understandably, proliferated. This proliferation can be expected to continue as the U.S. State Department and Treasury Department negotiate new income tax treaties and protocols. Earlier this year, the Treasury Department proposed several revisions and additions to the U.S. Model and announced its goal of completing its revision of the U.S. Model treaty this year.³ The following discussion identifies areas in which the pending protocols differ from the current U.S. Model treaty. First, I address those issues related to benefits conferred under the various agreements pending with your Committee, and second, the issues related to mutual administrative assistance, specifically exchange of information and mutual collection assistance.

A. Issues Related to the Benefits Provided to Relieve Double Taxation

Attribution of profits in treaty with Poland

In the proposed treaty with Poland, Article 7 (Business Profits) is the first United States treaty to adopt rules for the taxation by a treaty country of the business profits of an enterprise located in the other treaty country that is based on the language of Article 7 (Business Profits) of the OECD Model treaty. Although the language used in the OECD Model treaty differs from the U.S. Model treaty, the policy toward, and implementation of, the business profits article under the two models are substantively similar. The Committee may wish to ask the Treasury Department whether the use of the OECD Model treaty Article 7 in the Polish treaty represents a change in U.S. income tax treaty policy. One area in which the U.S. Model treaty and that of the OECD differ is the inclusion of an anti-abuse measure. The U.S. Model treaty, paragraph 7, and the proposed treaty, paragraph 5, include an anti-abuse provision treating income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment as taxable in the treaty country where the permanent establishment is located, even if the payment is deferred until after such permanent establishment has ceased to exist. The OECD Model treaty does not include a similar provision and the United States reserved the right to amend Article 7 to provide for taxation of income or gain even if payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist.⁴ The Committee may wish to ask the Treasury Department if they believe this provision is adequate to prevent the avoidance of tax on income attributable to a permanent establishment when that permanent establishment is no longer in existence.

Limitation-on-benefits provisions in treaties with Hungary, Chile, Poland, and Spain

Like the U.S. Model treaty, the proposed revisions to the treaties with Chile, Hungary, Poland, and Spain include extensive limitation-on-benefits rules (Chile, Article 24; Hungary,

³ Full text of the proposed rules published on May 20, 2015, at the Resource Center, Department of Treasury, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/international.aspx>.

⁴ See Commentaries to the OECD Model treaty, paragraph 79.

Article 22; Poland, Article 22; Spain, Article IX of the proposed protocol, amending Article 17 of the existing treaty) that are intended to prevent third-country residents from benefitting inappropriately from a treaty that generally grants benefits only to residents of the two treaty countries. This practice is commonly referred to as “treaty shopping.” With the inclusion of modern limitation-on-benefits rules, the proposed treaties with Hungary and Poland represent a significant opportunity to mitigate treaty shopping. The present treaties with Hungary and Poland are two of only seven U.S. income tax treaties that do not include any limitation-on-benefits rules.⁵ The lack of any limitation-on-benefits rules in combination with provisions for complete exemption from withholding on interest payments from one treaty country to the other treaty country present attractive opportunities for treaty shopping.⁶ For example, a November 2007 report prepared by the Treasury Department at the request of Congress suggests that the income tax treaty with Hungary has increasingly been used for treaty-shopping purposes as the United States adopted modern limitation-on-benefits provisions in its other treaties. In 2004, U.S. corporations that were at least 25-percent foreign owned made \$1.2 billion in interest payments to related parties in Hungary, the seventh largest amount of interest paid to related parties in any single country.⁷

Earlier this year, a possible revision of Article 22 (Limitation on Benefits) of the U.S. Model treaty was published for public comment. Although the limitation-on-benefits rules in the proposed treaties with Chile, Hungary, Poland and Spain are similar to the rules in other recent and proposed U.S. income tax treaties and protocols and in the U.S. Model treaty, they are not uniform. Your committee may wish to inquire about certain differences among these agreements, the underlying rationale for the differences and the extent to which they align with the policies in the U.S. Model treaty or its proposed revision. The principal differences from the U.S. Model treaty are the inclusion of the headquarters company category of qualified person, the derivative benefits rule, and the anti-abuse rule for triangular arrangements, and with respect to Spain, the standard for exercise of competent authority discretion to grant treaty benefits to persons or with respect to income not otherwise eligible.

As in the U.S. Model treaty, in the pending protocols, a recognized stock exchange includes certain exchanges specified in the treaty as well as any other stock exchange agreed

⁵ The other income tax treaties without limitation-on-benefits rules are the ones with Greece (1953), Pakistan (1959), the Philippines (1982), Romania (1976), and the U.S.S.R (1976). Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the income tax treaty with the U.S.S.R. applies to the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

⁶ The income tax treaty with Greece also provides for complete exemption from withholding on interest, although it contains restrictions that limit the availability of the exemption, such that a Greek company receiving interest from a U.S. company does not qualify for the exemption if it controls, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the U.S. company.

⁷ Department of the Treasury, *Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties* (Nov. 28, 2007). The report states that, as of 2004, it does not appear that the U.S.-Poland income tax treaty has been extensively exploited by third-country residents. Although the report also focused on Iceland to the same extent as Hungary, a 2007 Income Tax Convention with Iceland that includes a modern limitation-on-benefits provision has since taken effect.

upon by the competent authorities of the treaty countries. Your committee may wish to explore the rationale underlying the identification of recognized stock exchanges for purposes of limitations of benefits, and the criteria the Treasury Department considers when negotiating over the definition of a recognized stock exchange.

The derivative benefits rules may grant treaty benefits to a treaty-country resident company in circumstances in which the company itself would not qualify for treaty benefits under any of the other limitation-on-benefits provisions. Like other recent treaties, including those with Canada and Iceland as well as several European treaty countries, the proposed treaties with Poland, Spain and Hungary include a derivative benefits rule. Under the derivative benefits rule, a treaty-country company receives treaty benefits for an item of income if the company's owners (referred to in the proposed treaty as equivalent beneficiaries) reside in a country that is in the same trading bloc as the treaty country and would have been entitled to the same benefits for the income had those owners derived the income directly. The definition of equivalent beneficiary differs in the proposed agreements. With respect to Spain, a party whose ownership interest is held indirectly is not an equivalent beneficiary unless the intermediate owner also qualifies as an equivalent beneficiary, similar to the rule in the proposed revision to the U.S. Model treaty. The Chile treaty, like the existing U.S. Model treaty, does not include derivative benefits rules.

The proposed treaties with Chile and Hungary include special anti-abuse rules intended to deny treaty benefits in certain circumstances in which a Chilean or Hungarian resident company earns U.S.-source income attributable to a third-country permanent establishment and is subject to little or no tax in the third jurisdiction and (as applicable) Chile or Hungary. A rule on triangular arrangements is not included in the U.S. Model treaty, but similar anti-abuse rules are included in other recent treaties and protocols.

With respect to the headquarters company rule, the Committee may wish to explore the rationale for granting benefits to an entity that is not otherwise eligible for benefits. The proposed treaties with Chile and Hungary and the proposed protocols with Spain and Poland allow full treaty benefits for an entity that functions as a headquarters company, but does not satisfy the other categories of persons entitled to full treaty benefits. In doing so, they conform to U.S. income tax treaties in force with Austria, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland but not the U.S. Model treaty. The conditions for qualifying as a headquarters company include requirements intended to ensure that the headquarters company performs substantial supervisory and administrative functions for a group of companies, including its multinational nature, that the headquarters company is subject to the same income tax rules in its country of residence as would apply to a company engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in that country; and that the headquarters company has independent authority in carrying out its supervisory and administrative functions.

Finally, the Committee may wish to inquire whether it is appropriate to grant discretion to competent authorities to extend treaty benefits to persons not otherwise entitled to such benefits, and, if so, the standard for exercise of any such authority. As in the U.S. Model and other recently negotiated treaties with modern limitations on benefits articles, the proposed treaty with Poland includes a grant of discretion to the competent authority to extend otherwise unavailable treaty benefits to a party that is not otherwise entitled to treaty benefits if the

competent authority determines that the organization or operation of the person claiming benefits did not have as a principal purpose the obtaining of treaty benefits. By contrast, the proposed protocol with Spain requires that the competent authority evaluate the extent to which the resident of the other country met any of the criteria under other provisions in the article, without regard to motivation.

The Committee may wish to inquire of the Treasury Department about the alternative formulations of the standard for discretion to extend tax treaty benefits that have been proposed as part of Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) at the request of the G-20.⁸

Mandatory arbitration in treaties with Japan, Spain, and Switzerland

In addition to the proposed protocol with Japan, the protocols amending the Swiss and Spanish treaties also include revisions to the mutual agreement procedures to require competent authorities to resort to binding arbitration if unable to reach a resolution within a specified period of time. Although tax treaties traditionally have not included a mechanism to ensure resolution of disputes, the addition of mandatory procedures for binding arbitration as part of the mutual agreement procedures has become increasingly frequent in recent years. The U.S. tax treaties currently in effect with Belgium, Germany, France and Canada include such provisions. Mandatory binding arbitration is provided upon request of the taxpayer in paragraph 5 of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) of the OECD Model treaty. Following its two-year study on base erosion and profit shifting, the OECD concluded that the inclusion of mandatory binding arbitration is necessary to achieve the goal of the mutual agreement procedures, which generally encourage, but do not require, dispute resolution by the competent authorities.⁹

In considering the proposed protocols, the Committee may wish to consider the extent to which the inclusion of mandatory arbitration rules and the particular features of the arbitration provisions in the proposed protocols now represent the United States policy regarding mandatory binding arbitration. In particular, the Committee may wish to inquire about the criteria on which the Treasury Department determines whether to include such provisions in a particular treaty, the appropriate scope of issues eligible for determination by binding arbitration, the absence of precedential value of arbitration determinations, the role of the taxpayer in an arbitration proceeding and how to ensure adequate oversight of the use of mandatory arbitration.

Regardless of whether the Treasury Department expects mandatory arbitration to become a standard feature in all future U.S. tax treaties, the Committee may wish to inquire about the experience to date in the four treaties with such provisions currently in effect, and whether the

⁸ OECD, *Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances Action 6-2015 Final Report*, (October 5, 2015), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report_9789264241695-en

⁹ OECD, *Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14-2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Project*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Treasury Department intends to develop and publish a standardized set of arbitration principles and procedures for inclusion in a revision to the U.S. Model treaty.

Zero-withholding on parent-subsidiary dividends in treaties with Spain and Japan

When certain conditions are satisfied, the proposed protocol with Spain eliminates withholding tax on dividends paid by a company that is resident in one treaty country to a company that is a resident of the other treaty country and that owns at least 80 percent of the stock of the dividend-paying company (often referred to as “direct dividends”). The elimination of withholding tax on direct dividends is intended to reduce the tax barriers to direct investment between the two treaty countries. The proposed protocol with Japan broadens the scope of companies eligible for zero-withholding under the existing treaty by reducing the ownership and holding period thresholds for eliminating of withholding on dividends.

Until 2003, no U.S. income tax treaty provided for a complete exemption from dividend withholding tax, and the U.S. Model treaty does not provide an exemption. By contrast, many bilateral income tax treaties of other countries eliminate withholding taxes on direct dividends between treaty countries, and the European Union (“EU”) Parent-Subsidiary Directive repeals withholding taxes on intra-EU direct dividends. Recent U.S. income tax treaties and protocols with Australia, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, and New Zealand include zero-rate provisions. The Senate ratified those treaties and protocols in 2003 (Australia, Mexico, United Kingdom), 2004 (Japan, Netherlands), 2006 (Sweden), 2007 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Germany), 2009 (France), and 2010 (New Zealand). The proposed protocol with Spain therefore would bring to 13 the number of U.S. income tax treaties that provide a zero rate for direct dividends.

Because zero-rate provisions are a relatively recent but now prominent development in U.S. income tax treaty practice, the Committee may wish to consider possible costs and benefits of zero-rate provisions such as revenue considerations and diminishing of barriers to cross-border investment; the Treasury Department’s criteria for determining when a zero-rate provision is appropriate; and certain specific features of zero-rate provisions such as ownership thresholds, holding-period requirements, the treatment of indirect ownership, and heightened limitation-on-benefits requirements. These issues have been described in detail in connection with the Committee’s previous consideration of proposed income tax treaties and protocols that have included zero-rate provisions.¹⁰

Although zero-rate provisions for direct dividends have become a common feature of U.S. income tax treaties signed in the last decade, the U.S. Model treaty does not provide a zero-rate for direct dividends. In previous testimony before the Committee, the Treasury Department has indicated that zero-rate provisions should be allowed only under treaties that have restrictive limitation-on-benefits rules and that provide comprehensive information exchange. Even in those treaties, according to previous Treasury Department statements, dividend withholding tax should be eliminated only on the basis of an evaluation of the overall balance of benefits under

¹⁰ See, for example, Joint Committee on Taxation, *Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Germany* (JCX-47-07), July 13, 2007, pp. 82-84.

the treaty. Every recent U.S. income tax treaty or protocol has included restrictive limitation-on-benefits provisions and comprehensive information exchange provisions. The Committee therefore may wish to inquire into whether there are other particular considerations that the Treasury Department will now take into account in deciding whether to negotiate for zero-rate direct dividend provisions in future income tax treaties and protocols. The Committee also may wish to ask whether any new U.S. model income tax treaty might eliminate withholding tax on direct dividends and, if it would not so provide, why it would not.

Developments in substantive foreign tax laws of Chile, Poland and Spain

Based on our own research and on assistance from foreign law specialists of the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress's Law Library, we understand that there have been potentially noteworthy changes in the income tax laws of Chile, Poland, and Spain since the Foreign Relations Committee last considered the proposed agreements with those countries in 2014.

In Chile, the corporate-shareholder income tax, which is fully integrated by means of a shareholder-level credit for corporate tax paid on distributed profits, has been the subject of reform legislation scheduled to take effect in 2017. Under this reform, a shareholder of a Chilean corporation who is a resident of a country with which Chile does not have an income tax treaty will be credited with 65 percent, rather than 100 percent, of corporate tax paid on distributed profits. We understand that the government of Spain has also enacted legislation that, among other things, reduces the corporate tax rate and modifies depreciation rules. Finally, we understand that the government of Poland has enacted changes to the individual income tax and corporate income tax.

The Committee may wish to inquire whether the Treasury Department believes that the proposed agreements appropriately accommodate these internal law developments.

B. Administrative Assistance Issues

Mutual Collection Assistance with Japan

The proposed protocol with Japan departs from the U.S. Model Article 26 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) in providing for assistance in the collection of revenue claims of the other contracting state beyond those amounts required to ensure that treaty benefits are respected and limited to those entitled to them under the terms of the treaty. The Committee may wish to explore the basis for agreeing to this departure from general U.S. policy and the criteria applied in determining to do so. For example, the Committee may seek assurances as to the nature of safeguards protecting the rights of persons whose U.S. tax debts may be subject to collection in Japan and the extent to which persons with Japanese tax debts can be assumed to have had adequate opportunities for review of the merits of the underlying claim may also warrant inquiry.

The infrequency of such provisions is consistent with the revenue rule doctrine, which can be traced to the centuries-long tradition based on Lord Mansfield's statement, "For no

country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.”¹¹ Although its vitality and scope have been questioned, most recently in *Pasquantino v. United States*,¹² the doctrine remains a cornerstone of all common law jurisdictions, as well as many others. In determining whether to honor a judgment of a foreign court, U.S. courts generally do not accord comity to tax or penal judgments of a foreign court.¹³

In addition to the concerns about preserving the sovereignty of the United States and the rights of its taxpayers, the risk of increased administrative burden may also be considered. The agreement includes requirements that the authorities reach agreement to limit the volume of such requests and share costs of the program.

Exchange of information issues in all pending protocols

Tax treaties establish the scope of information that can be exchanged between treaty countries. Exchange of information provisions first appeared in the late 1930s,¹⁴ and are now included in all double tax conventions to which the United States is a party. A broad international consensus has coalesced around the issue of bank transparency for tax purposes and strengthened in recent years, in part due to events involving one of Switzerland’s largest banks, UBS AG, the global financial crisis, and the general increase in globalization. Greater attention to all means of restoring integrity and stability to financial institutions has led to greater efforts to reconcile the conflicts between jurisdictions, particularly between jurisdictions with strict bank secrecy and those seeking information to enforce their own tax laws.¹⁵ As a result, the Committee may wish to inquire as to whether the U.S. Model treaty published in 2006 remains the appropriate standard by which to measure an effective exchange of information program.

Although the United States has long had bilateral income tax treaties in force with Hungary, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, the United States has engaged in relatively limited exchange of information under these tax treaties. With Luxembourg and Switzerland, the limitations stem from strict bank secrecy rules in those jurisdictions. The proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland are a response to that history as well as part of the international trend in exchange of information.

¹¹ *Holman v. Johnson*, 98 The English Reporter 1120 (King’s Bench 1775), cited in *AG of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.*, 268 F.3d 103, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002).

¹² 544 U.S. 349; 125 S. Ct. 1766; 161 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2005).

¹³ *Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, secs. 483 (1987), stating “Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.” The principle is permissive, not a requirement.

¹⁴ Article XV of the U.S.-Sweden Double Tax Convention, signed on March 23, 1939.

¹⁵ See, Joint Committee on Taxation, *Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal; Part Three: Provisions Related to the Taxation of Cross-Border Income and Investment* (JCS-4-09), September 2009. Section VI of that pamphlet provides an overview of the international efforts to address these issues.

The pamphlets prepared by the Joint Committee staff provide detailed overviews of the information exchange articles in each of the pending protocols. They also describe the extent to which those articles differ from the U.S. Model treaty's rules on information exchange. The pamphlets published on May 20, 2011, describing the agreements with Hungary, Luxembourg, and Switzerland included detail about several practical issues relating to information exchange under income tax treaties. We addressed those issues in testimony with respect to those agreements and others in 2014. Since then, additional developments relevant to exchange of information with Luxembourg and Switzerland have occurred.

Here I wish to highlight first those issues related to the effectiveness of information exchange under income tax treaties that are common to all of the pending protocols under consideration today, and second, issues specific to the proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland and recent developments.

Effectiveness of U.S. information exchange agreements in general

Today, I will briefly note three issues: automatic exchange of information, the ability of the United States to provide information about beneficial ownership of foreign-owned entities, and the limitations on specific requests for information.

The Committee may wish to explore issues related to "routine exchange of information." In this type of exchange, also referred to as "automatic exchange of information," the treaty countries identify categories of information that are consistently relevant to the tax administration of the receiving treaty country and agree to share such information on an ongoing basis, without the need for a specific request. The type of information, when it will be provided, and how frequently it will be provided are determined by the respective Competent Authorities after consultation. In particular, the Committee may wish to inquire about the (1) the extent to which the United States presently engages in automatic exchange of taxpayer-specific information, (2) practical hurdles to greater use of automatic exchange, and (3) whether it anticipates significant changes in that practice with the ratification of the documents presently before the Committee.

The inability of the United States to provide information about beneficial ownership of entities formed in the United States has been criticized in the past and led to pressure to eliminate policies that provide foreign persons with the ability to shelter income.¹⁶ Because the information obtained through information exchange relationships with other jurisdictions has been central to recent successful IRS enforcement efforts against offshore tax evasion, the Treasury Department has included in its budgets for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 a proposal to address the perceived shortcoming by requiring certain financial institutions to report the account

¹⁶ Financial Action Task Force, IMF, *Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism United States of America*, pp. 10-11 (June 23, 2006); Government Accountability Office, *Company Formations: Minimal Ownership Information Is Collected and Available*, a report to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate GAO-06-376 (April 2006); Government Accountability Office, *Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by US Corporations Formed for Russian Entities*, GAO-01-120 (October 31, 2006).

balance (including, in the case of a cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, the cash value or surrender value) for all financial accounts maintained at a U.S. office and held by foreign persons.¹⁷ The Committee may wish to explore the extent to which either the existing U.S. know-your-customer rules or the corporate formation and ownership standards prevent the United States from providing information about beneficial ownership on a reciprocal basis with its treaty countries. The Committee may also consider whether there are steps to take that would help refute the perception that the United States permits States to operate as tax havens and that would help the United States better respond to information requests from treaty countries who suspect that their own citizens and residents may be engaging in illegal activities through U.S. corporations and limited liability companies.¹⁸

The Committee may wish to inquire as to the extent to which a request that a treaty country provide information in response to a John Doe summons¹⁹ is a specific request within the meaning of the Article 26, and whether protracted litigation similar to that which occurred in the UBS litigation²⁰ can be avoided or shortened. A “specific” request refers to an exchange which occurs when one treaty country provides information to the other treaty country in response to a specific request by the latter country for information that is relevant to an ongoing investigation of a particular tax matter. One problem with specific exchange has been that some treaty countries have declined to exchange information in response to specific requests intended to identify limited classes of persons.²¹ Your committee may wish to seek assurances that, under

¹⁷ A description and analysis of the complete proposal can be found in Joint Committee on Taxation, *Description of Certain Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Proposal* (JCS-2-14), December 2014, at pages 184-190. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, *Description of Certain Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Proposal* (JCS-2-15), September 2015, at page 248.

¹⁸ E.g., the “Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act,” S. 569, 111th Congress (2009), would require States to obtain and periodically update beneficial ownership information from persons who seek to form a corporation or limited liability company.

¹⁹ When the existence of a possibly noncompliant taxpayer is known but not his identity, as in the case of holders of offshore bank accounts or investors in particular abusive transactions, the IRS is able to issue a summons to learn the identity of the taxpayer, but must first meet greater statutory requirements, to guard against fishing expeditions. Prior to issuance of the summons intended to learn the identity of unnamed “John Does,” the United States must seek judicial review in an *ex parte* proceeding. In its application and supporting documents, the United States must establish that the information sought pertains to an ascertainable group of persons, that there is a reasonable basis to believe that taxes have been avoided, and that the information is not otherwise available.

²⁰ See, *United States v. UBS AG*, Civil No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla.), enforcing a “John Doe summons” which requested the identities of U.S. persons believed to have accounts at UBS in Switzerland. On August 19, 2009, the United States and UBS announced an agreement (approved by the Swiss Parliament on June 17, 2010) under which UBS provided the requested information.

²¹ For example, a petition to enforce a John Doe summons served by the United States on UBS, AG was filed on February 21, 2009, accompanied by an affidavit of Barry B. Shott, the U.S. competent authority for the United States-Switzerland income tax treaty. Paragraph 16 of that affidavit notes that Switzerland had traditionally taken the position that a specific request must identify the taxpayer. See *United States v. UBS AG*, Civil No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla.). On August 19, 2009, after extensive negotiations between the Swiss and U.S. governments, the United States and UBS announced that UBS had agreed to provide information on over 4,000 U.S. persons with accounts at UBS.

the proposed treaties and protocols, treaty countries are required to exchange information in response to specific requests that are comparable to John Doe summonses under domestic law.²²

Information exchange with Luxembourg and Switzerland

The existing treaties with Luxembourg and Switzerland include exchange of information articles that do not comply with the U.S. Model treaty, the terms of U.S. tax treaties currently in force, or the international norms on transparency. To date, neither jurisdiction has achieved a satisfactory rating under the peer review process of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, the international body organized within the OECD to conduct its work on exchange of information standards (“Global Forum”). The peer review is conducted in two phases: Phase I evaluates the legal and regulatory aspects of exchange, that is, whether or not the domestic law and administrative structures exist in a jurisdiction to enable it to exchange information. In Phase II, the peer review evaluates the actual practice of exchange of information.²³ Both jurisdictions have made progress in addressing the deficiencies, according to the Global Forum, but neither has yet been rated to be compliant or largely compliant.

Switzerland

The exchange of information article in the 1951 U.S.-Swiss treaty was limited to “prevention of fraud or the like.” Under the treaty, Switzerland applied a principle of dual criminality, requiring that the purpose for which the information was sought also be a valid purpose under local law. Because “fraud or the like” was limited to nontax crimes in Switzerland, information on civil or criminal tax cases was not available. The provision was substantially revised for the present treaty, signed in 1996, and accompanied by a contemporaneous protocol that elaborated on the terms used in the exchange of information article. That 1996 Protocol was intended to broaden the circumstances under which tax authorities could exchange information to include tax fraud or fraudulent conduct, both civil and criminal. It provided a definition at paragraph 10 of “tax fraud” to mean “fraudulent conduct that causes or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of tax paid to a contracting state.” In practice, exchange apparently remained limited, leading the competent authorities to negotiate a subsequent memorandum of understanding that included numerous examples of the facts upon which a treaty country may base its suspicions of fraud to support a request to exchange information.²⁴

²² Under a John Doe summons, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asks for information to identify unnamed “John Doe” taxpayers. The IRS may issue a John Doe summons only with judicial approval, and judicial approval is given only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that taxes have been avoided and that the information sought pertains to an ascertainable group of taxpayers and is not otherwise available.

²³ Certain OECD conclusions about information exchange with Luxembourg and Switzerland are noted below. The OECD peer reviews of Chile and Hungary found that although those jurisdictions generally are compliant with OECD standards, each country had certain deficiencies preventing fully effective information exchange.

²⁴ “Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Tax Convention of October 2, 1996,” reprinted at paragraph 9106, *Tax Treaties*,

The proposed protocol, by replacing Article 26 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) of the present treaty and amending paragraph 10 of the 1996 Protocol, closely adheres to the principles announced by Switzerland. It also conforms to the standards, if not the language, of the exchange of information provisions in the U.S. Model treaty in many respects. As a result, the proposed protocol may facilitate greater exchange of information than has occurred in the past, chiefly by eliminating the present treaty requirement that the requesting treaty country establish tax fraud or fraudulent conduct or the like as a basis for exchange of information and providing that domestic bank secrecy laws and lack of a domestic interest in the requested information are not possible grounds for refusing to provide requested information. Lack of proof of fraud, lack of a domestic interest in the information requested, and Swiss bank secrecy laws were cited by Swiss authorities in declining to exchange information. The proposed protocol attempts to ensure that subsequent changes in domestic law cannot be relied upon to prevent access to the information by including in the proposed protocol a self-executing statement that the competent authorities are empowered to obtain access to the information notwithstanding any domestic legislation to the contrary.

Nevertheless, there are several areas in which questions about the extent to which the exchange of information article in the proposed protocol may prove effective are warranted. The proposed revisions to paragraph 10 of the 1996 Protocol reflect complete adoption of the first element listed above in the Swiss negotiating position, “limitation of administrative assistance to individual cases and thus no fishing expeditions.” The limitation poses issues regarding (1) the extent to which the Swiss will continue to reject requests that do not name the taxpayer as a result of the requirement that a taxpayer be “typically” identified by name, and (2) the standard of relevance to be applied to requests for information, in light of the caveat against “fishing expeditions.” In addition, the appropriate interpretation of the scope of purposes for which exchanged information may be used may be unnecessarily limited by comments in the Technical Explanation. In particular, although paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Exchange of Information), as modified by the proposed protocol, generally prohibits persons who receive information exchanged under the article from using the information for purposes other than those related to the administration, assessment, or collection of taxes covered by the treaty, the paragraph also allows the information to be used for other purposes so long as the laws of both the United States and Switzerland permit that use and the competent authority of the requested country consents to that use. The Technical Explanation, however, states that one treaty country (for example, the United States) will seek the other treaty country’s (for example, Switzerland’s) consent under this expanded use provision only to the extent that use is allowed under the provisions of the U.S.-Switzerland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1977.

The extent to which Swiss commitment to transparency in practice is consistent with international norms remains the subject of inquiry by the Global Forum, despite the apparent adoption of the OECD standards on administrative assistance in tax matters in 2009,²⁵ when it

(CCH 2005).

²⁵ See “Switzerland to adopt OECD standard on administrative assistance in fiscal matters,” Federal Department of Finance, FDF (March 13, 2009), available at <http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=25863> (last accessed March 1, 2011).

simultaneously announced key elements that it would require as conditions to be met in any new agreements. The Swiss conditions established by the Federal Council limited administrative assistance to individual cases and only in response to a specific and justified request. Although Switzerland is considered by the OECD to be a jurisdiction that has fully committed to the transparency standards of the OECD, the OECD report on Phase I of its peer review of Switzerland states that the Swiss authorities' initial insistence on imposing identification requirements as a predicate for exchange of information was inconsistent with the international standards and that additional actions would be needed to permit the review process to proceed to Phase II. Those actions include bringing a significant number of its agreements into line with the standards and taking action to confirm that all new agreements are interpreted in line with the standard. On October 1, 2015, the Global Forum launched the Phase II peer review of Switzerland, signaling that the actions taken by Switzerland to improve its transparency with respect to tax matters since the Phase I report have satisfied the Global Forum.

According to advice we received from foreign law specialists at the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress's Law Library, the actions taken by the Swiss since the initial unfavorable Phase I peer review include its agreement to the international standards on automatic exchange, expansion of its information exchange network, amendment of existing agreements to conform to the international transparency norms, and revision of domestic law to ensure the ability of tax authorities to comply with the exchange of information obligations and safeguards required in its bilateral and multilateral agreements. A report of the recently launched Phase II peer review is expected in 2016.

Luxembourg

The proposed protocol with Luxembourg, by replacing Article 28 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) of the 1996 treaty, is consistent with both the OECD and U.S. Model treaties. There are several areas in which questions are warranted about the extent to which the new article as revised in the proposed protocol may prove effective. These questions arise not from the language in the proposed protocol itself but from the mutual understandings reflected in diplomatic notes exchanged at the time the protocol was signed. Potential areas of concern are found in statements in the diplomatic notes concerning (1) the obligation to ensure tax authority access to information about beneficial ownership of juridical entities and financial institutions, other than publicly traded entities, to the extent that such information is of a type that is within the possession or control of someone within the territorial jurisdiction, (2) the requirement that all requests must provide the identity of the person under investigation, (3) the standard of relevance to be applied in stating a purpose for which the information is sought, and (4) the requirement that requests include a representation that all other means of obtaining the information have been attempted, except to the extent that to do so would cause disproportionate difficulties.

The Global Forum's Phase II peer review of Luxembourg's implementation of transparency and information exchange standards reported in 2013 that Luxembourg was non-compliant with OECD standards. Based on the research assistance from foreign law specialists of the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress's Law Library, we understand that Luxembourg has undertaken significant action to address the deficiencies identified in the earlier peer review report. These measures include ratification of the OECD Multilateral

agreement that is pending before this Committee, implementation of various directives of the European Union, and enactment of legislation in 2014 explicitly intended to remedy a number of criticisms of the Global Forum report.²⁶ It has also ratified a number of bilateral agreements that include exchange of information provisions that comply with the international norms. Based on these measures, the Global Forum agreed to conduct a supplementary peer review, which was launched on January 16, 2015. The results of that review are not yet known.

Expansion of the OECD Multilateral mutual administrative assistance agreement

One of the most significant changes to the multilateral convention made by the proposed protocol is the opening of membership in the convention to states that are neither OECD nor Council of Europe members. The signatories include a number of countries who are not members of G-20,²⁷ the OECD or the Council of Europe: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, and Tunisia. All members of G-20 are among the signatories. Those members of G-20 who are not also members of either the OECD or Council of Europe include Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Thus, on the one hand, the inclusive standard for permitting nations to participate has opened the multilateral convention to a number of significant trade partners of the United States. On the other hand, it requires the United States to initiate an exchange of information program with jurisdictions with which it has not previously entered into a bilateral relationship. Among the signatories that have neither a tax treaty nor a TIEA with the United States are Albania, Andorra, Croatia, Ghana, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore.

The extent to which any of those states are jurisdictions with which the United States has previously participated in an exchange of information program and whether the program has operated satisfactorily are areas in which the Committee may wish to inquire. To the extent that they are jurisdictions with whom the United States has no exchange of information program under a bilateral agreement, the Committee may wish to inquire about the extent to which the United States has been able to satisfy itself that each jurisdiction is an appropriate partner for exchange of information. The Committee may also wish to inquire whether the expanded exchange of information requirements will be manageable.

The Committee may also wish to inquire about the circumstances under which the United States would object to accession by a non-member state, as contemplated under the procedures for securing the unanimous consent of the governing body of the treaty before the agreement may enter into effect with respect to that non-member state. For example, in explaining its general standards for considering entry into a bilateral agreement with a jurisdiction, Treasury has stated, "... prior to entering into an information exchange agreement with another jurisdiction, the Treasury Department and the IRS closely review the foreign jurisdiction's legal

²⁶ Law of November 25, 2014: New applicable procedure with respect to exchange of information on request, amending the Law of March 31, 2010.

²⁷ G-20, or the Group of Twenty, is a forum for international economic cooperation among the member countries and the European Union. The leaders of the members meet annually, while finance and banking regulators meet more frequently throughout the year. They work closely with a number of international organizations, including the OECD.

framework for maintaining the confidentiality of taxpayer information. In order to conclude an information exchange agreement with another country, the Treasury Department and the IRS must be satisfied that the foreign jurisdiction has the necessary legal safeguards in place to protect exchanged information and that adequate penalties apply to any breach of that confidentiality.”²⁸

Conclusion

The matters that I have described in this testimony are addressed in more detail in the Joint Committee staff pamphlets on the proposed treaties and protocols. I am happy to answer any questions that your committee may have at this time or in the future.

²⁸ Preamble to Treas. Reg. 1.6049-4(b)(5). T.D. 9584, April 12, 2012.